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“BULL” COMING FROM THE STATES:
WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD USE
WILLIAMS V. ILLINOIS TO CLOSE ONE OF
BULLCOMING’S CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE LOOPHOLES
TARA R. PRICE
“[T]he Clause does not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply
because the court believes that questioning one witness about another’s testimonial statements provides a fair enough opportunity for
cross-examination.”1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are selected as a juror in a trial where the
defendant is accused of driving while under the influence of alcohol.
You listen to the police officer who testifies that he observed the

J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Florida State University College of Law; B.A. Political
Science, 2001, University of South Florida. I wish to thank Professor Charles W. Ehrhardt
for his helpful guidance on the Court’s development of the Confrontation Clause and its
implications in the courtroom and Professor Nat S. Stern for his input on earlier drafts and
encouragement of my scholarship. Finally, thank you to my husband, Trey Price, for his
love, encouragement, and constant support.
1. Bullcoming v. New Mexico (Bullcoming III), 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2716 (2011).
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defendant and believed him to be intoxicated. You hear about how,
after obtaining a warrant, the officer took the defendant to the emergency room for a blood-alcohol test. The police officer finishes his
testimony, and the next witness will testify about the results of the
defendant’s blood-alcohol test.
But before the witness can testify, defense counsel objects. Apparently, this is not the laboratory analyst who conducted the test. In
fact, this expert witness did not observe the testing process, write the
lab report soon to be admitted into evidence, or certify that the testing
results were accurate. The actual analyst who performed the test will
not appear as a witness because he is on unpaid administrative
leave. And no, you may not know why.
The judge overrules the objection and the uninvolved expert witness testifies about the lab’s procedures and answers questions about
what the lab report states—that the defendant had a blood-alcohol
level above the legal limit. On the stand, however, the uninvolved
expert witness admits that he cannot verify that that lab’s procedures were actually followed. Would you convict?
In reality, this hypothetical scenario is not as hypothetical as it
may seem.2 Numerous juries have convicted defendants based on second-hand (or hearsay) expert witness testimony about laboratory
reports performed and certified by other analysts who never appeared
at trial.3
On June 23, 2011, however, the Supreme Court put this practice
to a stop in Bullcoming v. New Mexico.4 Or did it? In perhaps the
closest majority in recent Confrontation Clause history, the Supreme
Court affirmed that the protections of the Sixth Amendment extend
to the admission of scientific evidence against a defendant, so long as
the evidence consists of a written report admitted at trial. Thus, in
the case of the hypothetical, the defendant would have the right to
cross-examine an analyst involved in the testing process, though not
necessarily the actual analyst who performed the test. Despite the
sound foundations of the majority’s reasoning, however, the Court
failed to create a clear rule in Bullcoming,5 giving states multiple
2. See State v. Bullcoming (Bullcoming I), 189 P.3d 679, 681-82, 684 (N.M. Ct. App.
2008), aff’d, 226 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
3. See infra Part IV.B-D; see also FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining hearsay as “a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted”).
4. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
5. Arguably, the Court has taken nothing but a cautious series of “baby steps”
through its modern Confrontation Clause jurisprudence: Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36 (2004), Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129
S. Ct. 2527 (2009), Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011), Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct.
2705 (2011), and now Williams v. Illinois, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011). See CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT, at ix-x (1999)
(recommending that courts “avoid[] clear rules and final resolutions” to be “[a]lert to the
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loopholes to use to avoid implicating Confrontation Clause requirements. The Court may move to close one of these four loopholes relatively quickly: the Court granted certiorari in Williams v. Illinois6
five days after deciding Bullcoming, ensuring we have not heard the
Court’s “last word” on the Confrontation Clause as it applies to the
admission of scientific evidence against defendants.
This Note examines the modern history of the Confrontation
Clause, beginning with the Court’s decision to overturn more than
two decades of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in Crawford v.
Washington7 and continuing with Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts’8
requirements for the admission of testimonial scientific evidence.
Second, this Note examines the Court’s recent decision in Bullcoming, particularly Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence. This Note argues
that Justice Sotomayor’s four limitations on Bullcoming’s holding
provide lower courts with a series of loopholes they may continue to
use to avoid Confrontation Clause requirements, at least until the
Court directly addresses each of the loopholes. Finally, this Note
urges the Court to close one of Justice Sotomayor’s Bullcoming loopholes by reversing the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in People v.
Williams.9 The Supreme Court should not tolerate prosecutors’ attempts to avoid Confrontation Clause requirements by introducing
otherwise testimonial evidence through surrogate witnesses under
the guise of Federal Rule of Evidence 703.
II. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Sixth Amendment and the Roberts Reliability Test
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution places a constitutional burden on the government, in addition to any applicable federal or state evidentiary rules, for admitting evidence against a defendant at trial. In relevant part, the Sixth Amendment states that
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
be confronted with the witnesses against him.”10 But how should the
Court define “witnesses against” or “to be confronted”? Are neutral
scientists “witnesses against” a defendant? Should expert witnesses

problem of unanticipated consequences” and “promote the democratic ideals of
participation, deliberation, and responsiveness”).
6. 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011).
7. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
8. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
9. People v. Williams (Williams II), 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S.
Ct. 3090 (June 28, 2011) (No. 10-8505).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In addition to applying to federal criminal trials, the
Confrontation Clause applies to state criminal proceedings via the Fourteenth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).

536

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:533

be able to testify to their own independent opinions when those opinions
are based on inadmissible testimonial evidence?
As the Court noted in 2004, “[t]he Constitution’s text does not
alone resolve” the matter.11 Courts are frequently in disagreement
about exactly how the Confrontation Clause intersects with the Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly hearsay rules.12 Even the Supreme Court has reversed its own analysis when navigating complex
cases involving the intersection of the Confrontation Clause and
hearsay rules.13
Under the Court’s earlier holding in Ohio v. Roberts,14 the Confrontation Clause was an empty safeguard for defendants, seemingly
granting strong protection, but in reality providing prosecutors with
numerous exceptions to evade its enforcement.15 Permitting these
exceptions was a practicality for the Court, because if the Constitution were read literally, the Confrontation Clause “would abrogate
virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unintended
and too extreme.”16 As such, out-of-court statements were permitted
at trial, so long as the prosecution could show that the witness was
unavailable17 and that the evidence bore “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ ”18 The Court held that reliability could be shown by meeting a
“firmly rooted hearsay exception,”19 despite noting the hearsay rule
had been “riddled with exceptions developed over three centuries”
ago and resembled “an old-fashioned crazy quilt made of patches
cut from a group of paintings by cubists, futurists and surrealists.”20
Even if the evidence did not meet one of the several hearsay exceptions within the Federal Rules of Evidence,21 it could properly be

11. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.
12. See infra Parts IV.D, V.B.
13. Compare Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (stating that “certain hearsay
exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within
them comports with the ‘substance of the constitutional protection’ ”) (quoting Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)), with Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (overturning
Roberts and stating that “[l]eaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of
evidence would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most
flagrant inquisitorial practices”).
14. 448 U.S. 56.
15. The Crawford Court held that its earlier reasoning in Roberts was “so
unpredictable that it fail[ed] to provide meaningful protection from even core confrontation
violations.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63.
16. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.
17. To show unavailability, the state must have made a good-faith effort to obtain the
witness’s presence at trial. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
18. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 62 (quoting Edmund M. Morgan & John MacArthur Maguire, Looking
Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 921 (1937)).
21. See FED. R. EVID. 803-04.
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admitted against the defendant at trial so long as it presented a
“particularized guarantee[] of trustworthiness.”22
B. Crawford v. Washington: The Beginning of the Modern
Confrontation Clause
Led by Justice Scalia, a seven-member majority23 on the Court
took a dramatic turn in Confrontation Clause history in Crawford v.
Washington.24 Overturning the Roberts decision and its reasoning, the
Court examined the Confrontation Clause’s history25 and determined
that “[a]dmitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation.”26 Reflecting on the
previous twenty-four years, the Court noted that “[t]he legacy of Roberts
in other courts vindicates the Framers’ wisdom in rejecting a general
reliability exception.”27 What the Confrontation Clause guaranteed,
the Court held, was not that evidence could be admitted after being
deemed reliable, “but that reliability [must] be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”28
“[W]ritten evidence . . . [is] almost useless,” as the Framers recognized, and “very seldom leads to the proper discovery of truth.”29 A
trial judge or jury cannot possibly determine, based on written evidence
alone, whether test results were fabricated, poorly performed, or
otherwise the product of fraud. Unlike reliance on a written statement, cross-examination provides the defendant with her constitutional
right to test the witness’s perception, credibility, and partiality.30
The Crawford Court, however, did not hold that all evidence admitted against the accused was subject to a Confrontation Clause
analysis.31 The majority was mainly concerned with evidence it con22. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
23. Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer formed
Crawford’s majority opinion; Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor filed a
concurring opinion. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 36-76 (2004).
24. Id.
25. For the Court’s historical background on the Confrontation Clause, see id. at 42-50.
26. Id. at 61. “Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable,”
the Court held, “is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously
guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.” Id. at 62. The Crawford
Court was concerned that “[r]eliability is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept.”
Id. at 63.
27. Id. For example, Roberts would have allowed trial courts to determine that the
need for “effective law enforcement” outweighed a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights.
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64.
28. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. “To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure
reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.” Id.
29. Id. at 49 (alteration in original) (quoting R. Lee, Letter IV by the Federal Farmer
(Oct. 15, 1787), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 469, 473 (1971)).
30. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
31. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (stating the Confrontation Clause “reflects an especially
acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court statement”).
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sidered “testimonial.”32 Once a witness’s evidence is considered
testimonial, it may not be admitted without showing the witness’s
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.33 Even
when a witness was clearly absent from the jurisdiction, the Court
has held that the government had not shown unavailability until it
sought in good faith the witness’s presence.34
With Crawford, Justice Scalia’s seven-member majority attempted
to make clear that a defendant’s right to cross-examination is so
fundamental that alternative methods of showing a statement’s reliability would not suffice.35 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O’Connor concurred with the majority’s ultimate holding, but disagreed with the Court’s overruling of Roberts.36 Specifically, Chief
Justice Rehnquist took aim at the majority’s decision to bifurcate testimonial and nontestimonial evidence for purposes of the Confrontation
Clause. Rehnquist argued that the Crawford decision was “not
backed by sufficiently persuasive reasoning” and that it “cast[] a
mantle of uncertainty over future criminal trials.”37
And “cast[] a mantle of uncertainty” Crawford did. Courts struggled with determining whether a variety of different types of evidence
were testimonial.38 Two years after Crawford, in Davis v. Washington,39 the Court made the definition of “testimonial” a bit murkier.
Despite Crawford’s suggestion that police interrogations were likely
testimonial,40 in Davis, the Court held that they might not be testimonial after all if they were conducted to meet an ongoing emergency.41
But were the results of scientific tests testimonial? In subsequent
years, courts across the country were holding that many types of
32. Testimonial statements included “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent,” including “material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony
that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that
declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially” and police officer
interrogations. Id. at 51-52 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 23, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No.
02-9410), 2003 WL 21939940).
33. Id. at 59. Even where the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination, the Court “excluded the testimony where the government had not established
unavailability of the witness.” Id. at 57.
34. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (holding that the government had not
shown unavailability, even though the witness was in a federal prison in another state).
The Barber Court also noted that securing out-of-state witnesses was not difficult because
participating states could use the “Uniform Act [t]o Secure the Attendance of Witnesses
from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings” to compel private citizens to appear in
Court to testify. Id. at 723 n.4; see also 2 BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER,
WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 10:12 n.78 (15th ed. 2010) (providing the specific
statutes for all 50 states that have adopted some version of the Uniform Act).
35. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62.
36. Id. at 69-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
37. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
38. See, e.g., discussion infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
39. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
40. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
41. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
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scientific evidence, such as lab reports and certifications of substances’
chemical compositions, were not testimonial because they were
“ ‘regularly conducted business activit[ies],’ ” thus eligible for admission as a hearsay exception.42 Other courts considered scientific evidence nontestimonial because it was raw data and not the product of
expert opinion.43
C. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts: The Court Applies the
Confrontation Clause to Scientific Evidence in Criminal Trials
It was not until 2009 that the Supreme Court first determined
whether sworn scientific certificates were testimonial.44 Still led by
Justice Scalia, only five justices joined the majority opinion,45 but
several aspects of the decision left significant doubt as to the limitations
on the Court’s opinion.
In Melendez-Diaz, the majority held that a defendant’s right to
confront adverse witnesses extended beyond those who observed an
alleged crime and included laboratory scientists who analyzed
criminal evidence in preparation for trial.46 The Court found that certified laboratory certificates, which were notarized and provided the
composition, quality, and net weight of a substance, were within
the “core class of testimonial statements” because they were “quite
plainly affidavits.”47
However, despite Melendez-Diaz “involv[ing] little more than the
application of [the Court’s] holding in Crawford,”48 Justice Thomas’s
concurrence removed all doubt about the reach of the majority opinion. Justice Thomas stated that he joined the majority only because
the laboratory certificates were “formalized testimonial materials.”49
As such, courts speculated on the reach of the Court’s decision if the
certificates admitted into evidence were unsworn.50
42. See, e.g., Bullcoming I, 189 P.3d 679, 684-85 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting State v.
Dedman, 102 P.3d 628, 639 (N.M. 2004), aff’d, 226 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
2705 (2011)).
43. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 135.
44. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
45. Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg formed the five-member
majority in Melendez-Diaz. Id. at 2530-42. However, Justice Thomas additionally wrote a
separate concurring opinion emphasizing the narrowness of his agreement. Id. at 2543
(Thomas, J., concurring). Justices Kennedy and Breyer, formerly in the Crawford
majority, joined Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito in dissent. Id. at 2543-61
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 2532.
47. Id. Affidavits were specifically mentioned within the definition of testimonial
articulated in Crawford. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
48. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2542.
49. Id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing his prior concurrences in White v.
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008), and Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006)).
50. See infra note 160.
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Justice Thomas did not object, however, to the majority’s holding
in regards to the categorization of laboratory scientists as adverse
witnesses. Despite the State of Massachusetts’ argument that scientists
were not “accusatory witnesses” because they were only testifying
about scientific facts (as opposed to the defendant’s guilt), the majority quickly dispelled the notion that any witness in a criminal trial
could be neutral.51 Because the scientific evidence was testimonial
and the analyst certifying its authenticity was accusatory, the state
was required under the U.S. Constitution to present the analyst for
confrontation at trial.52
The Melendez-Diaz majority reaffirmed that the Confrontation
Clause is a procedural guarantee, once again stating that reliability
is assessed through cross-examination, not the eyes of a trial judge.53
Further, the majority insisted cross-examining analysts was essential because “neutral scientific testing” was not as “neutral or as reliable” as the state suggested.54
D. The Human Element Creates Unreliability in Science
Scientific tests are neither inherently neutral nor reliable: the
tests themselves can rely upon bad or outdated science, and the scientists performing the tests have been found to falsify, manipulate,
or improperly perform them.55 For example, in 2004, the National
Academy of Sciences found that due to variations in the manufacturing
of bullets, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) decades-long
practice of relying on “comparative bullet-lead analysis” in criminal
trials was “unreliable and potentially misleading.”56 Despite
“[h]undreds of defendants sitting in prisons nationwide” convicted
with the help of FBI testimony that was “overstated” and “misleading
under [the] [F]ederal [R]ules of [E]vidence,” the FBI “never [went]
back to determine how many times its scientists misled jurors.”57
Years later, the National Academy released a report criticizing numerous forensic laboratory practices across the country involving the

51. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2533-34 (stating that the analysts “certainly provided
testimony against petitioner”). “The text of the [Sixth] Amendment contemplates two
classes of witnesses—those against the defendant and those in his favor. . . . Contrary to
respondent’s assertion, there is not a third category of witnesses, helpful to the
prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation.” Id. at 2534.
52. Id. at 2533-34.
53. Id. at 2536 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61-62 (2004)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2536-37.
56. John Solomon, FBI’s Forensic Test Full of Holes, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2007, at A1.
57. Id. (stating that the FBI first had concerns about the science as early as 1991 and
that the concerns were only publicly revealed after a former FBI laboratory scientist
decided to challenge the practice).
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scientific analyses of “fingerprinting, firearms identification[,] . . .
bite marks, blood spatter, hair and handwriting.”58
Scientists may also make errors in judgment or produce fraudulent test results. Analysts working at law enforcement’s request often
“face pressure to sacrifice appropriate methodology for the sake of
expediency.”59 Law enforcement may also give analysts incentives to
alter evidence to help the prosecution.60 Analysts have even been
found to engage in deliberate, systematic fraud.61
Even if the analyst performed the test to the best of her abilities,
the scientific testing of evidence is not inherently reliable.62 Scientific
tests, including the frequently used gas spectrometer/mass chromatographer (GC/MS) and polymerase chain reaction DNA tests, require
the analyst to use independent judgment and skill.63 The GC/MS “is
like working a jigsaw puzzle,” and an analyst performing the test
“may commit a number of errors that will render the ultimate opinion unsound.”64 In fact, analysts can make four “critical errors” in interpreting GC/MS results.65 An analyst making even one of these errors in judgment could alter the identification of the sample.66

58. Solomon Moore, Science Found Wanting in Nation’s Crime Labs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
5, 2009, at A1 (stating that “such analyses are often handled by poorly trained technicians
who then exaggerate the accuracy of their methods in court”); see generally Nat’l Research
Council of the Nat’l Acads., Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path
Forward (2009), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12589.html.
59. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536 (quoting Nat’l Research Council of the Nat’l
Acads., supra note 58, at 24).
60. See Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV . 475, 497
& n.99, 498 (2006) (citing a Federal Bureau of Investigation study that found
prosecutors sometimes pressure analysts to “push the envelope” and that the analysts,
in turn, respond).
61. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536-37 (discussing several documented cases of
error, fraud, and instances where forensic scientists engaged in “drylabbing” by reporting
the results of tests never performed); Metzger, supra note 60, at 499 (detailing a West
Virginia forensic serologist who disregarded procedures, altered records, and deliberately
misreported test results from 1979 until 1989).
62. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537 (stating “[c]onfrontation is designed to weed out
not only the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as well”).
63. Id.
64. 2 P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 23-3(C), at 402-403
(3d ed. 1999).
65. Id. (including (1) improper preparation of the sample where the GC fails to
separate the sample before the MS analysis occurs; (2) miscounting mass unit numbers
along the spectrum; (3) disregarding one peak along the spectrum, which could change the
drug’s identification if the analyst chose to include it; and (4) failing to distinguish between
the true parent peak and a false isotopic peak). The Supreme Court recognized the
potential for these four errors in Melendez-Diaz. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537.
66. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 64; see also Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct.
at 2537-38 (recognizing that even though GC/MS machines can be “equipped with computerized matching systems, ‘forensic analysts in crime laboratories typically do not utilize
this feature of the instrument, but rely exclusively on their subjective judgment.’ ” (quoting
James M. Shellow, The Application of Daubert to the Identification of Drugs, 2 SHEPARD’S
EXPERT & SCI. EVIDENCE Q. 593, 600 (1995))).
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Further, performing DNA tests and analyzing the results requires
more independent analysis than the GC/MS test, presenting even
more opportunity for errors in judgment.67 With such a high potential
for error, defendants must have “a reasonable opportunity to determine through cross-examination if any such error or falsification is
present in any DNA testing admitted into evidence.”68
Jurors give scientific test results significant credibility in a criminal trial.69 Confronting scientists in the courtroom gives defendants
the opportunities to uncover errors in judgment or faulty procedures
in a way they never could without cross-examination.70 Even if crossexamination proved ineffective in an individual case, the Court found
the “prospect of confrontation” was important because it would help
“deter fraudulent analysis in the first place.”71
In a sign of restraint, however, and possibly to help keep hold on
its majority, the Melendez-Diaz Court specifically held that it was not
requiring in-court testimony from everyone who knew something
about the evidence’s authenticity or the accuracy of the testing devices.72
In the infamous footnote 1, the Court held that any gaps in the chain
of custody would go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibil-

67. Williams II, 939 N.E. 2d 268, 279 (Ill. 2010) (citing P. GIANNELLI & E.
IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 18.04(b), at 57 (4th ed. 2007) (stating “when
technical problems materialize, it can be very difficult to interpret the electropherograms
. . . . Thus, there is room for subjective judgment”)), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (June 28,
2011) (No. 10-8505). For a brief explanation of polymerase chain reaction testing (a
common form of DNA testing), see id. at 271.
68. United States v. Boyd, 686 F. Supp. 2d 382, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that
denying the defendant the opportunity to question an analyst on his results and
conclusions is a violation of the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights).
69. Nat’l Research Council of the Nat’l Acads., supra note 58, at 48-49 (stating that
academics are concerned with whether “the conclusiveness and finality of the manner in
which forensic evidence is presented on television results in jurors giving more or less
credence to the forensic experts and their testimony than they should, raising expectations,
and possibly resulting in a miscarriage of justice”). For additional research analyzing the
possibility of the CSI Effect, see Jennifer B. Sokoler, Note, Between Substance and
Procedure: A Role for States’ Interests in the Scope of the Confrontation Clause, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 161, 163 n.11, 179 n.93 (2010) (citing multiple studies); Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI
and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE
L.J. 1050, 1053 (2006) (noting that after Robert Blake’s acquittal, “jurors complained about
the lack of fingerprints, DNA, and gunshot residue—evidence not often available in
criminal trials but frequently used on television”); Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa,
Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: Media and Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STAN.
L. Rev. 1335, 1343 (2009) (analyzing CSI as a “cultural phenomenon” and possibly a “selfdenying prophecy” promoted by prosecutors); and Hon. Donald E. Shelton, Young S. Kim &
Gregg Barak, A Study of Juror Expectations and Demands Concerning Scientific Evidence:
Does the “CSI Effect” Exist?, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331, 332-33 (2006) (concluding,
after a survey of 1,027 jurors who served in a Michigan state court during the summer of
2006, that the CSI effect was “mixed” but a “broader tech effect” may be causing increased
juror demand for scientific evidence).
70. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536-37.
71. Id. at 2537.
72. Id. at 2532 n.1.
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ity, and that so long as the prosecution introduced the testimony live
(through a qualified witness), the evidence was admissible.73
Footnote 1 also legitimately gave prosecutors some wiggle room
when it came to which witnesses they would present at trial for crossexamination.74 This wiggle room “confound[ed] the lower courts,”
allowing the states to read Melendez-Diaz narrowly and continue to
evade the constitutional requirements of the Confrontation
Clause through a number of measures.75 Fifteen months after the
Melendez-Diaz decision, by granting one defendant’s petition for
writ of certiorari, the Court waded back into determining what the
Confrontation Clause requires for the admission of scientific evidence, if anything.76
III. BULLCOMING V. NEW MEXICO: THE COURT NARROWLY AFFIRMS
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE’S PROMISE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
The Bullcoming77 opinion represents the Court’s closest-held Confrontation Clause majority in recent history. Written by Justice
Ginsburg, the majority opinion held that when a forensic laboratory
report containing testimonial statements is entered into evidence, the
Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant the right to confront
the scientist who certified the testimonial information.78 And yet,
in a case where the facts were “materially indistinguishable” from
Melendez-Diaz,79 an analysis of the Court’s majority, concurring,
and dissenting opinions80 shows this seemingly straightforward
application of Confrontation Clause law was anything but clear-cut for
the Justices.

73. Id.
74. Id. (stating “it is up to the prosecution to decide what steps in the chain of custody
are so crucial as to require” live testimony).
75. Joëlle Anne Moreno, C.S.I. BullS#!t: The National Academy of Sciences, MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts, and Future Challenges to Forensic Science and Forensic Experts,
2010 UTAH L. REV. 327, 331 (2010) (calling the post-Melendez-Diaz cases “so disparate and
bizarre” and providing as many as seven different factors used by the lower courts in
making their ultimate decisions).
76. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010) (granting certiorari).
77. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
78. Id. at 2710.
79. Id. at 2721 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
80. Justice Ginsburg wrote a fractured majority opinion, with Justice Scalia joining in
full, Justices Sotomayor and Kagan objecting to Part IV, and Justice Thomas objecting to
Part IV and footnote 6. Id. at 2705-19. Justice Sotomayor also wrote a concurring opinion.
Id. at 2719-23 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy,
Breyer, and Alito, as they did in the Court’s Melendez-Diaz decision, dissented. Id. at 272328 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

544

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:533

A. Bullcoming: The Facts81
Donald Bullcoming rear-ended Dennis Jackson’s pick-up truck
while it was stopped at an intersection in Farmington, New Mexico.82 Jackson’s wife called the police after Jackson noticed that Bullcoming’s eyes were bloodshot and smelled alcohol on Bullcoming’s
breath.83 Bullcoming left the scene of the accident, but an officer subsequently found him and watched him fail a series of field sobriety
tests.84 The police obtained a warrant to perform a blood-alcohol
analysis because Bullcoming refused to take a breath test.85
Using a gas chromatograph machine,86 Caylor, an analyst with the
New Mexico Department of Health, Scientific Laboratory Division,
tested Bullcoming’s blood.87 It was not until the day of the trial, however, that the prosecution informed the court it would not be calling
Caylor as a witness, stating only that he had been put on unpaid leave
very recently; the prosecution did not disclose the reason.88 Instead,
the State presented another analyst from the laboratory, Razatos,
who “was familiar with the laboratory’s testing procedures, but had
neither participated in nor observed the test on Bullcoming’s blood
sample.”89 Defense counsel objected, but the trial court admitted the
blood analysis report into evidence under the hearsay exception for
business records.90 The trial court also allowed Razatos to testify.91

81. The facts of Bullcoming provide the reader with background perspective on the
issues underlying the legal discussions within the case. The author does not suggest that
Donald Bullcoming may be innocent of the charges against him. His reprehensible conduct
does, however, illustrate that the government’s burden is the same high standard,
regardless of whether the defendant appears to be guilty or innocent. See Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (“Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously
guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”).
In some instances, following Confrontation Clause procedure can make all the
difference. See Martin Finucane, Drug Defendant Retried on High Court’s Order is
Acquited, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 11, 2011, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/
massachusetts/articles/2011/02/11/drug_defendant_retried_on_high_courts_order_is_acquit
ted/ (stating that after the Supreme Court’s verdict, Melendez-Diaz was found not guilty in
his jury retrial).
82. State v. Bullcoming (Bullcoming II), 226 P.3d 1, 4 (N.M. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
2705 (2011).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 4-5.
85. Id. at 5.
86. Id. at 4.
87. Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2710.
88. Id. at 2711-12. The prosecution did not assert that Caylor was “unavailable” for
trial; rather, “[t]he record showed only that [he] was placed on unpaid leave for an
undisclosed reason.” Id. at 2714.
89. Id. at 2709; see also Bullcoming II, 226 P.3d at 6.
90. Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2712.
91. Id. at 2712 n.3 (noting that the trial judge stated that when he started practicing
law “there were no breath tests or blood tests. They just brought in the cop, and the cop
said, ‘Yeah, he was drunk.’ ”).
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At trial, the State of New Mexico admitted the results of Bullcoming’s blood sample into evidence, showing his blood-alcohol concentration was 0.21 grams per hundred milliliters.92 The prosecution
asked Razatos whether “any human being could look and write and
just record the result” from the gas chromatograph, and he answered
in the affirmative.93 While the blood sample report indicated that
Caylor had followed the laboratory’s procedures,94 Razatos also admitted that “you don’t know unless you actually observe the analysis
that someone else conducts, whether they followed th[e] protocol in
every instance.”95 The jury convicted Bullcoming of aggravated DWI
(Driving While Intoxicated).96
Bullcoming raised five issues on appeal,97 including whether the
trial court violated his Confrontation Clause rights by admitting
the blood sample report into evidence when Caylor was not available
to testify.98 One year before Melendez-Diaz,99 the New Mexico
Court of Appeals held that Bullcoming’s blood alcohol report was
admissible because it was nontestimonial “and prepared routinely
with guarantees of trustworthiness.”100 Even though Crawford abrogated the prior reliability test of Ohio v. Roberts, the court of appeals
held that it was bound by State v. Dedman101 and that the blood sample report was properly admitted because it met the requirements for
hearsay exemption.102
92. Id. at 2710.
93. Bullcoming II, 226 P.3d at 6.
94. Id.
95. Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2715 n.8.
96. Id. at 2709, 2712.
97. Bullcoming I, 189 P.3d 679, 681 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d, 226 P.3d 1 (N.M.
2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
98. Id.
99. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
100. Bullcoming I, 189 P.3d at 685 (citing State v. Dedman, 102 P.3d 628 (N.M. 2004)).
101. Id. (citing Dedman, 102 P.3d at 636 (holding that the New Mexico courts could
still use the Roberts reliability test so long as they determined the laboratory reports were
nontestimonial evidence, because a “close reading of Crawford indicates” that the Supreme
Court “appears split” on whether the Confrontation Clause only applies to testimonial
evidence)). The Dedman court stated that “the [Supreme] Court did not overrule Roberts,
and it did not reply to [Chief Justice Rehnquist’s] assertion that it had done so.” Id. (citing
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)) (even though
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from the Crawford Court’s decision to overrule Roberts,
he filed a concurring opinion). But see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (providing a list of the
“core class of ‘testimonial’ statements,” including “material such as affidavits” and
“formalized testimonial materials”).
102. Bullcoming I, 189 P.3d at 684-85 (stating that “ ‘ordinarily a blood alcohol report
is admissible as a public record and presents no issue under the Confrontation Clause
because the report is non-testimonial and satisfies’ the test of Ohio v. Roberts . . . abrogated
by Crawford . . . concerning the admission of hearsay evidence under the Confrontation
Clause’ ” (citing Dedman, 102 P.3d at 636)). The New Mexico Court of Appeals admitted,
“We are bound by Dedman, a decision of our Supreme Court, and we therefore do not
address the opinions of other states on the issue[,] . . . ‘even when a United States Supreme
Court decision seems contra.’ ” Id. at 685 (quoting State v. Manzanares, 674 P.2d 511, 512

546

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:533

One year following the court of appeals’ decision, the Supreme
Court held in Melendez-Diaz103 that “[t]here [was] little doubt” that
analysts’ certificates of analysis fell “within the ‘core class of testimonial statements’ ” listed in Crawford.104 The New Mexico Supreme
Court had already granted certiorari to hear Bullcoming’s appeal105
and admitted that, post Melendez-Diaz, Dedman was no longer good
law.106 As such, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that laboratory
reports prepared for use at Bullcoming’s trial were testimonial and
required a qualified witness subject to cross-examination.107
However, like many other states that have attempted to reduce
some of the burdens of the Confrontation Clause,108 the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that the “Defendant’s true ‘accuser’ was the gas
chromatograph machine which detected the presence of alcohol in
Defendant’s blood, assessed Defendant’s [blood-alcohol content], and
generated a computer print-out listing its results.”109 Because Caylor
“was a mere scrivener,” who had “simply transcribed the results generated by the gas chromatograph machine,” having another analyst
testify in court was “sufficient” to fulfill Bullcoming’s Confrontation
Clause rights.110

(1983)). But see Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009) (“Whether or
not they qualify as business or official records, the analysts’ statements here—prepared
specifically for use at petitioner’s trial—were testimony against petitioner, and the
analysts were subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.”).
103. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
104. Id. at 2532.
105. Bullcoming I, 189 P.3d 679 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d, 226 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2010),
rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
106. Bullcoming II, 226 P.3d at 8. The Court also recognized that “Melendez-Diaz
throws into doubt our assessment in Dedman that blood alcohol reports as public records
are inherently immune from governmental abuse.” Id. at 7-8.
107. Id. at 8 (“Melendez-Diaz made clear that the same concerns of governmental abuse
which exist in the production of evidence by law enforcement exist in the production of
forensic evidence. . . . ‘[A] forensic analyst responding to a request from a law enforcement
official may feel pressure—or have an incentive—to alter the evidence in a manner
favorable to the prosecution’ ”) (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536).
108. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
109. Bullcoming II, 226 P.3d at 9 (citing United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause does not forbid the use of raw data produced by
scientific instruments, though the interpretation of those data may be testimonial.”),
United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The raw data generated
by the diagnostic machines are the ‘statements’ of the machines themselves, not their
operators.”), and United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2005)
(concluding that the computer-generated header information accompanying pornographic
images retrieved from the Internet “was neither a ‘statement’ nor a ‘declarant’ ”)).
110. Bullcoming II, 226 P.3d at 4, 9 (holding that Razatos was a sufficient “surrogate”
witness, simply because he was “qualified as an expert witness with respect to the gas
chromatograph machine”). The New Mexico Supreme Court did at least recognize that “[a]
defendant cannot cross-examine an exhibit.” Id. at 10.
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B. Analyzing the Supreme Court’s Opinion in Bullcoming
In a strongly-worded majority opinion, the Supreme Court reiterated its commitment to enforcing the principles of the Confrontation
Clause,111 holding that the “potential ramifications of the New Mexico
Supreme Court’s reasoning . . . raise[d] red flags.”112 One witness’s
testimonial statement may not be “enter[ed] into evidence through
the in-court testimony of a second person.”113 Further, the Court held
that Caylor’s report was obviously testimonial.114 Caylor’s presence at
trial was essential because he was more than a “mere scrivener.”115
Even if the blood sample report was obviously reliable, “the Clause
does not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because the
court believes that questioning one witness about another’s testimonial
statements provides a fair enough opportunity for crossexamination.”116 Harkening back to much of its reasoning within the
Melendez-Diaz decision, the Court detailed several significant questions that Razatos could not answer.117 Perhaps most importantly,
Razatos could not testify as to why Caylor was placed on administrative leave, and defense counsel had the right to ask whether Caylor’s
absence was due to “incompetence, evasiveness, or dishonesty.”118
111. Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2716 (“Our precedent cannot sensibly be read any
other way.”). The Court had also previously vacated and remanded a proceeding from the
Supreme Court of Virginia for failing to follow the Melendez-Diaz precedent when it held
that the defendant waived his Confrontation Clause rights by failing to invoke his
Compulsory Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment. Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316
(2010); see Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540 (stating “the Compulsory Process Clause [] is
no substitute for the right of confrontation” and “the Confrontation Clause imposes a
burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those
adverse witnesses into court”).
112. Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2714.
113. Id. at 2713, 2715 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2546 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Court made this point clear in Davis)); see Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006) (stating that “we do not think it conceivable that the
protections of the Confrontation Clause can readily be evaded by having a note-taking
policeman recite the unsworn hearsay testimony of the declarant”).
114. Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2717 (restating, as the Court did in Melendez-Diaz,
that “document[s] created solely for an ‘evidentiary purpose,’ . . . made in aid of a police
investigation, rank[] as testimonial”).
115. Id. at 2714. The Court stated that “Caylor certified that he received Bullcoming’s
blood sample intact,” and that he “checked to make sure that the forensic report number
and the sample number ‘correspond[ed].’ ” Id. (alteration in original). He also certified that
he “adher[ed] to a precise protocol” in performing the test and that “no ‘circumstance or
condition . . . affect[ed] the integrity of the sample or . . . the validity of the analysis.’ ” Id.
(alteration in original). “These representations, relating to past events and human actions
not revealed in raw, machine-produced data, are meet for cross-examination.” Id.
116. Id. at 2716 (stating also that “no substitute procedure [such as cross examining a
substitute witness] can cure the violation”).
117. Id. at 2715 (stating that Razatos could not testify about “the test and the testing
process [Caylor] employed,” nor could he “expose any lapses or lies on [Caylor’s] part”).
118. Id. Justice Scalia particularly hammered the Respondent about why Caylor was
on unpaid leave, asking if the prosecution intentionally set up their case so that Caylor
would not have to testify. Oral Argument at 38, id. (No. 09-10876), available at
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Justice Ginsburg noted the dissent’s “objection [was] less to the
application of the Court’s decisions in Crawford and Melendez-Diaz
to this case than to those pathmarking decisions themselves.”119 The
dissent, however, labeled the majority’s opinion as a “new and serious
misstep,” because Bullcoming was provided with a “knowledgeable
representative of the laboratory,” which was all that is required by
the Confrontation Clause.120 Labeling Caylor a “technician” (as opposed
to an “analyst”), the dissent considered Caylor’s presence a “hollow
formality” and (counter to Melendez-Diaz) stated that Bullcoming
still had the opportunity under the Compulsory Process Clause to
call Caylor to the stand.121 Dismissing the majority’s concerns in
Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz, the dissent considered the scientific
process to render “impartial lab reports” through the work of “experienced technicians in laboratories that follow professional norms and
scientific protocols.”122
Several of the Justices failed to join in the opinion in its entirety,
arguably falling somewhere in between Justice Ginsburg’s majority
opinion and Justice Kennedy’s dissent.123 Notably, Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Thomas refused to join in Part IV of the majority opinion, leaving only Justices Ginsburg and Scalia to advance the
notion that the Bullcoming holding will not “impose an undue burden
on the prosecution” and that the “predictions of dire consequences . . .
are dubious.”124 Perhaps Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Thomas
were not willing to agree that retesting the evidence is almost always
an option or that the burden of initiating the retesting of evidence
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/09-10876.pdf (stating
that “I don’t know what the facts are, but boy, it smells bad to me. It really does,” and that
“the mere possibility” that the prosecution set up the case to avoid Caylor’s crossexamination “shows why you should have to bring this person in if you want to introduce
his testimony”).
119. Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2713 n.5.
120. Id. at 2723 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
121. See id. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Melendez-Diaz Court previously
rejected this argument when it stated that a defendant’s “ability to subpoena” laboratory
analysts under the Compulsory Process Clause was “no substitute for the right of
confrontation.” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009).
122. Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2726 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
123. See supra note 80. Despite the Bullcoming Court issuing a majority opinion
with which most Justices agreed, Justices Thomas’s, Kagan’s, and Sotomayor’s refusal to
join in the entire opinion effectively limits its precedential value. Cf. Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (stating that plurality opinions of the Court where no
single rationale explains the result should be read to advance the concurring opinion “on
the narrowest grounds”).
124. Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2717-18 (stating that only a “small fraction . . . of
cases” go to trial and estimating that “nearly 95% of convictions in state and federal courts
are obtained via guilty plea”) (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527,
2540 (2009)). Justices Ginsburg and Scalia also stated that defendants routinely stipulate
to admitting scientific evidence and that “analysts testify in only a very small percentage of
cases,” because defense counsel likely would not want to “highlight” the scientific evidence
through live testimony. Id. at 2718.
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would properly fall on the State, and not a defendant, when the testing analyst is unavailable.125 Most troubling, however, is Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion, which painstakingly “emphasize[d] the
limited reach of the Court’s opinion” and describes several factual
scenarios that Bullcoming “does not present.”126
For Justice Sotomayor, the blood sample report was testimonial
because “its ‘primary purpose’ [was] evidentiary,” particularly considering the lab report’s formality.127 Perhaps one reason that Justices
Sotomayor and Thomas consider formality an important component
of testimonial statements is that informal statements are given less
weight and credibility than formal ones.128
Justice Sotomayor’s limitations on the reach of the majority opinion—by illustrating several factual scenarios that the majority opinion
did not address—almost certainly invites the states to continue to
reduce Confrontation Clause burdens on the prosecution.129 As such,
125. Id. This argument could be considered inconsistent with the Court’s prior dicta
regarding states’ “notice-and-demand” statutes. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541 (stating
that “[s]tates are free to adopt procedural rules governing objections” because “[t]he
defendant always has the burden of raising his Confrontation Clause objection”).
126. Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2719-23 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice
Sotomayor’s replacement of Justice Souter caused much speculation as to the future of the
Court’s interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. Jonathan Adler, Souter, Sotomayor, &
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 29, 2009, 5:55 AM),
http://volokh.com/posts/1246125087.shtml (speculating that Justice Sotomayor’s prior
history as a prosecutor and trial court judge “may lead her to take a more pragmatic, and
less bright-line-oriented approach” and that “her ascension to the Court could have
dramatic consequences for criminal law, as she could create a new Court majority on these
issues and roll back recent decisions on the Confrontation Clause, sentencing rules, and
other areas of criminal law”); Lyle Denniston, Analysis: Is Melendez-Diaz Already
Endangered?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2009, 1:51 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2009/06/new-lab-report-case-granted/ (speculating as to why, so soon after deciding
Melendez-Diaz, the Court granted certiorari in Briscoe v. Virginia,130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010)).
127. Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2719 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Thomas did
not join Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, but for him, formality is arguably an essential
aspect of determining the testimonial nature of evidence. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at
2543 (Thomas, J., concurring). This formality requirement may be the very reason the
Bullcoming majority used the word to describe the blood sample report. See Bullcoming III,
131 S. Ct. at 2717. It may also be why Justice Thomas refused to join in footnote 6. Id. at
2714 n.6 (stating not that a testimonial statement must be formal, but that it must have
the “ ‘primary purpose’ of ‘establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution’ ” (alteration in original) (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S.
813, 822 (2006))).
128. Josephine Ross, What’s Reliability Got to Do With the Confrontation Clause
After Crawford?, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 383, 386 n.20 (2009); Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (“An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance
does not.”).
129. Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2722-23 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Instead of
providing clarity on the majority opinion, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence almost
guarantees the Supreme Court will be asked to review Confrontation Clause appeals
matching each of the “factual circumstances” she described. The Court has already
accepted certiorari in Williams v. Illinois, where Illinois used Federal Rule of Evidence 703
to allow an uninvolved expert witness to rely on underlying testimonial reports (which
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her concurring opinion provides an excellent analytical vehicle for
evaluating how these potential future cases may impact the Court’s
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. The remainder of this
Note will address Justice Sotomayor’s limitations on Bullcoming and
evaluate Williams v. Illinois,130 the Court’s next significant evolution
of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
IV. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’S FOUR BULLCOMING LOOPHOLES
A. The Evidence is Offered for “an Alternate Purpose”
Justice Sotomayor first stressed that the Bullcoming prosecutors did
not suggest that the blood sample report was provided for “an alternate purpose,” suggesting the Court may have reached a different
result had the blood sample report been conducted for the purposes of
medical treatment.131 However, the Court has previously indicated in
recent decisions that statements made for the purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment were not statements made for the “primary
purpose” of use at trial and, therefore, not testimonial nor subject to
the Confrontation Clause.132 Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence only mentions statements for the purposes of medical treatment as an example of
an “alternate purpose” for the blood sample report, likely because this
may be the only exception under Federal Rule of Evidence 803 that a
state could logically use to admit a blood sample report into evidence.133 It will be interesting to see if, in the wake of Bullcoming,
prosecutors seek other exceptions under the Federal Rules of Evidence
by asserting the evidence was generated for or served another purpose.
B. The Report is Merely a Machine-Generated Printout
Justice Sotomayor also stated that the Bullcoming decision did
not address scenarios where the statements admitted at trial are
simply printouts of data from laboratory machines.134

were never admitted into evidence) to form the basis of her opinion at trial. Williams v.
Illinois, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (June 28, 2011) (No. 10-8505), 2011 WL 2535081.
130. 131 S. Ct. 3090.
131. Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
132. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 n.9 (2011) (listing Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(4) as one of many hearsay exceptions made for a purpose other than
prosecution); Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2533 n.2 (stating that “medical reports created
for treatment purposes” would not be testimonial).
133. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not permit the states to admit laboratory
reports as nontestimonial public records. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8); cf. Melendez-Diaz, 129
S. Ct. at 2538-40 (discussing why a laboratory report cannot be considered nontestimonial
as a business record under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6)).
134. Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (recognizing the
State of New Mexico’s argument that the Court did not have to rule on the testimonial
nature of machine-generated printouts because the State introduced the analyst’s
certification of the results instead).
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Several courts have held that “raw data” printed from a machine
cannot be testimonial, because the machine is the witness “accusing”
the defendant.135 This reasoning, however, is nothing more than “an
attempt to cheat Crawford,”136 as any reliance on it overlooks the fact
that these scientific tests could not be performed without a human
element,137 which is susceptible to mistakes.138 Further, a person
operating the machine must, at some point, record the evidence as
belonging to a particular suspect; would this declaration of the sample’s ownership not be, in and of itself, testimonial?139
Technicians operating crime laboratory equipment must first undergo significant training and carefully follow crucial steps to ensure
the accuracy of the machine-generated data.140 Even if the analyst is
aware of the laboratory’s procedures, cross-examination for machinegenerated printouts is essential to ensure the procedures were actually
followed and that the report was not fraudulently produced to overcome backlog and the pressures of law enforcement.141 Until the
Court closes this loophole, prosecutors will likely continue to incorrectly
admit machine-generated printouts into evidence, alleging they are
nontestimonial because the printouts are simply “raw data.”

135. United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that “the
witnesses with whom the Confrontation Clause is concerned are human witnesses, and
that the evidence challenged in this appeal does not contain the statements of human
witnesses”); United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Confrontation
Clause does not forbid the use of raw data produced by scientific instruments, though the
interpretation of those data may be testimonial.”); United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d
225, 230 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The raw data generated by the diagnostic machines are the
‘statements’ of the machines themselves, not their operators.”).
136. Joe Bourne, Note, Prosecutorial Use of Forensic Science at Trial: When is a Lab
Report Testimonial?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1058, 1082 (2009).
137. Washington, 498 F.3d at 232-33 (Michael, J., dissenting) (stating that computerprinted test results “were the hearsay statements of the technicians who ran the tests” and
that “[t]he test results, although computer-generated, were produced with the assistance
and input of the technicians and must therefore be attributed to the technicians”).
138. Id. at 235 (Michael, J., dissenting) (“Forensic test reports are not always accurate.
Testing errors are sometimes caused by technician inexperience, sample contamination,
failure to follow laboratory protocols, or breaks in the chain of custody.”). Conversely, some
automatic machine printouts, such as transmission information including web site
addresses or fax numbers, truly may not involve a direct human element. Id. at 233
(Michael, J., dissenting) (discussing United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138 (10th Cir.
2005) (involving computer-generated header information from an internet web site) and
United States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498 (3d Cir. 2003) (involving transmission
information printed on a faxed document)).
139. See Richard D. Friedman, Thoughts on Bullcoming, THE CONFRONTATION BLOG
(June 24, 2009, 8:12 PM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2011/06/thoughts-onbullcoming.html.
140. Washington, 498 F.3d at 233 (Michael, J., dissenting); see, e.g., supra note 65 and
accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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C. The Substitute Witness is a Supervisor or Test Reviewer
Post Melendez-Diaz, many states recognized they had a duty to
provide defendants with a knowledgeable analyst suitable for crossexamination.142 For example, the Confrontation Clause would not allow
the prosecution to substitute the crime lab receptionist for crossexamination in place of a scientific analyst. Therefore, a testifying analyst who had not performed the actual tests would be required to meet
certain standards to pass the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.
While Bullcoming made clear a surrogate witness who had no
personal knowledge of the scientific test at issue would not meet the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence stated that Bullcoming does not apply to cases involving a
“supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited,
connection” to the test.143 But how involved in the testing process
must the testifying witness have been?
Many courts held that the expert witness needed to have been involved in the testing process itself at some level. Both the Fourth and
Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that it was not a Confrontation Clause violation when the non-test-performing analyst who
developed conclusions based upon test results testified at trial.144 The
Florida Supreme Court relied on these cases when it held expert
testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause, so long as the person making the conclusions based on the test results “was present at
trial and subject to cross-examination with regard to those results.”145
While these courts did require the witness to have had significant involvement with interpreting the test results, none actually required
the employee who performed the test to face confrontation at trial.146

142. See Pendergrass v. State, 913 N.E.2d 703, 708 (Ind. 2009) (holding that the
testimony of a supervisor at the crime lab and a DNA expert witness provided the
defendant with “two witnesses who were directly involved in the substantive analysis”),
cert. denied, Pendergrass v. Indiana, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010); State v. Dilboy, 999 A.2d 1092,
1104-05 (N.H. 2010) (holding that testimony from the assistant laboratory director who
reviewed the test results was sufficient to provide the defendant his Confrontation Clause
rights), vacated, Dilboy v. New Hampshire, 131 S. Ct. 3089 (2011) (vacating and remanding
for further proceedings in light of Bullcoming).
143. Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2722 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“We need
not address what degree of involvement is sufficient because here Razatos had no
involvement whatsoever in the relevant test and report.”).
144. United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding it was the
interpretation of the raw data, not the test results, that may be testimonial); United States
v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 229-30 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that the test-performing
employees were technicians, not analysts).
145. Smith v. State, 28 So. 3d 838, 854-55 (Fla. 2009), cert. denied, Smith v. Florida,
131 S. Ct. 3087 (2011).
146. Moon, 512 F.3d at 362 (stating “the Sixth Amendment does not demand that a
chemist or other testifying expert have done the lab work himself”); Washington, 498 F.3d
at 229-30 (stating “there would be no value in cross-examining the lab technicians”);
Smith, 28 So. 3d at 854-855.
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Some courts strayed beyond the expert who analyzed the material
to allow laboratory supervisors to testify at trial. These courts have
held that laboratory supervisors could adequately testify to the
standard procedures used in a laboratory, explain why specific tests
were performed, and address whether those tests required the use of
independent judgment and skill.147 Many courts sharing this view
ruled this way because the supervisors were personally involved in
the work of their laboratory employees.148
Supervisors might be a sufficient alternative to the testperforming analyst because they are responsible for the operations of
their laboratories. They can be questioned about the procedures they
established in the lab and how those procedures guarantee accurate
test results. Supervisors also are charged with monitoring their
employees’ performances and have more personal knowledge of an
employee’s analytical skills than a regular colleague would possess.
Finally, supervisors frequently have more training than their employees, which gives them the ability to critically review test results
and recognize deficiencies in performance.
However, even a laboratory supervisor might not be able to testify
whether the laboratory procedures were followed if they did not watch
their subordinate perform the entire test. Lab tests are quite complicated, taking significant amounts of time and often involving the coordination of several analysts, not just one.149 Given these facts, it
would be extremely unlikely that laboratory supervisors could monitor
the procedures of all of their employees closely enough to be able to testify about the procedures used based on their personal knowledge.150
147. Dilboy, 999 A.2d at 1104; see also Pendergrass, 913 N.E.2d at 708 (holding that
competent testimony from a supervisor prevented the defendant from complaining that he
lacked adequate opportunity to cross-examine a witness).
148. United States v. Turner, 591 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 2010) (where the supervisor
had peer-reviewed the test-performing employee’s work), petition for cert. filed, No. 0910231, (Apr. 12, 2010); Washington, 498 F.3d at 229-30 (where the lab’s chief toxicologist
made conclusions based on test results performed by lab technicians under his
supervision); Smith, 28 So. 3d at 853 (where the supervisor interpreted the data based on
test results from biologists on her team); Pendergrass, 913 N.E.2d at 707-08 (where the
supervisor had personally performed a technical review of the employee’s tests); Dilboy,
999 A.2d at 1097 (where the testifying analyst was the assistant laboratory director of the
state police forensics toxicology lab).
149. See, e.g., Brief of the States of Indiana, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 9-10, Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (No. 07-11191) (stating that
in New York, the crime labs “use an assembly-line-like rotation system for DNA analysis,
sometimes involving up to 40 analysts per case”).
150. Should a supervisor’s personal knowledge even matter when the analyst who
certified the test results may not remember the test by the time of trial? See Brief for the
Respondent in Opposition at 36, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (No. 07591) (stating that the lab technician who performed the test may often fail to “recall from
actual memory information relating to the specific contents of the writing and would rely
instead upon the record of his or her own action”) (quoting People v. Johnson, 121 Cal. App.
4th 1409, 1413 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2004)). Strictly applying “Crawford may ‘seem
particularly nonsensical when there is little chance that the actual declarant, the author of
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D. The Witness Relied on Testimonial Evidence to Give Her
Independent Opinion
Justice Sotomayor also limited Bullcoming by stating the opinion
did not address cases in which “expert witness[es] w[ere] asked for
[their] independent opinion[s] about underlying testimonial reports
that were not themselves admitted into evidence.”151 Such a scenario
occurs when the prosecution attempts to avoid Confrontation Clause
issues by giving a laboratory report to an uninvolved expert witness
to discuss at trial under the guise of Federal Rule of Evidence 703,
which states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases
an opinion or inference . . . need not be admissible in evidence in
order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that
are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines
that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.152

Per Rule 703, the prosecution can even argue testimonial evidence
should be disclosed at trial, not for the truth of the matter, but instead to allow the jury to better evaluate the expert witness’s opinion.153 Further, Federal Rule of Evidence 705 aids the prosecution by
making clear that testimonial facts and data could be revealed under
cross-examination.154 “One of the greatest dangers in allowing otherwise inadmissible evidence under Rule 705,” however, “is that the
jury will consider the facts and data as substantive evidence rather
than as merely constituting the underlying basis for the expert’s
opinion.”155 Instead of solely serving as an evidence rule for expert
the forensic report, will still have an independent memory of conducting the test by the
time of trial.’ ” Id. (quoting Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the Confrontation
Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 791, 836 (2007)).
151. Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2722 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
152. FED. R. EVID. 703 (2010) (emphasis added to reflect new language added during
the 2000 amendment to Rule 703). The Federal Rules of Evidence were amended in
December 2011 for stylistic purposes, but the amendments were not intended to change the
rules substantively. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note. The State of Illinois has
not adopted the 2000 amendment to Rule 703. Brief in Opposition for the Respondent at 10
n.5, Williams v. Illinois, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011) (No. 10-8505), 2011 WL 2535081. The pre2000 Rule 703 is arguably even more prone to misapplication, “result[ing] in the
destruction of constitutional rights.” Ronald L. Carlson, Is Revised Expert Witness Rule 703 A
Critical Modernization for the New Century?, 52 FLA. L. REV. 715, 725, 744 (2000) (arguing
prior judicial misapplications should end with the adoption of the new amended rule).
153. Brief in Opposition for the Respondent, supra note 152, at 10.
154. FED. R. EVID. 705 (2010) (stating “[t]he expert may in any event be required to
disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination”). The Federal Rules of Evidence
were amended in December 2011 for stylistic purposes, but the amendments were not
intended to change the rules substantively. FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee’s note.
155. Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 505-06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Cole v.
State, 839 S.W.2d 798, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (Maloney, J., concurring on rehearing));
see also Daniel F. Blanchard, III, South Carolina Evidence Rule 703: A Backdoor Exception
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witnesses, Rule 703 has, in effect, created an additional exception to
the rules against hearsay.156
With the risk of the jury considering the scientific evidence for the
truth of the matter, it is hard to imagine a defendant could effectively
use cross-examination when it would merely result in the jury hearing additional, unverified, testimonial information from the expert
witness. As Justice Sotomayor acknowledged, prosecutors using the
Federal Rules of Evidence to “allow[] an expert witness to discuss
others’ testimonial statements” would present a different question for
the Court indeed.157
For this Bullcoming loophole, however, the Court is not postponing
ruling on the issue. Five days after deciding Bullcoming, the Court
granted certiorari in Williams v. Illinois.158 Given that the Court only
needs four Justices’ votes to hear a case,159 it could have been the four
dissenting Justices from Bullcoming who voted to grant certiorari.
While any attempts to guess a motive (or the identity of the Justices
granting certiorari) would be mere speculation, if it was the four dissenting Justices, they could be hoping to limit the Confrontation
Clause’s constitutional requirements to cases where the prosecution
actually admits a laboratory or scientific report into evidence.
V. WILLIAMS V. ILLINOIS: THE COURT’S OPPORTUNITY TO CLOSE ONE
OF JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’S BULLCOMING LOOPHOLES
Instead of allowing the Bullcoming dissenters to narrow the protections of the Confrontation Clause, the Court should use Williams
v. Illinois160 to shore up its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence regardto the Hearsay Rule?, 13 S.C. LAWYER 14, 17 (2002) (stating “if in forming an opinion
someone assumes that certain facts are true, the acceptance of that opinion necessarily
involves the acceptance of those assumed facts” (citing Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence
as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV.
583, 584-85 (1987)); Carlson, supra note 152, at 736 (“The grave risk that jurors will
misuse the testimony as substantive proof has been widely recognized.”). Once the jury
hears the testimonial evidence, the horse is arguably out of the barn:
[J]urors are asked to do the impossible. They are told to consider the hearsay,
not for its truth, but only as the basis of the expert[’]s opinion. No one truly
believes jurors (or anyone else for that matter) are capable of making that
subtle distinction. Instead, jurors consider the hearsay even when the evidence
is regarded as too unreliable for admission as substantive evidence.
L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony: Back to the Future, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1389,
1403 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
156. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Williams v. Illinois, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011)
(No. 10-8505), 2011 WL 2535081 (citing MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, GRAHAM’S HANDBOOK OF
ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 703.1, at 684 (10th ed. 2010)).
157. Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2722 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
158. 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011).
159. JAMES P. GEORGE, THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOOR: A FEDERAL JURISDICTION
GUIDE 170 (2002) (citing Harris v. Pa. R.R. Co., 361 U.S. 15 (1959)).
160. 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011).
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ing the admission of scientific evidence against a defendant. States
should not be allowed to evade constitutional protections by keeping
laboratory reports secret and using Rule 703 to justify the use of
“surrogate” expert witnesses when, if the reports were entered into
evidence, Bullcoming would require cross-examination of the analysts who certified them.161
A. Williams v. Illinois: The Facts
In April 2001, Sandy Williams was arrested for sexual assault,
aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery.162 More than one
year earlier, in February 2000, a twenty-two-year-old woman identified as “L.J.” had been attacked while walking home from work after
8:00 p.m. in Chicago.163 L.J.’s mother contacted the police, who arrived
at L.J. and her mother’s home shortly after 9:00 p.m.164 L.J. described
the perpetrator as “a black male, 5 foot, 8 inches tall, wearing a black
skull cap, a black jacket and driving a beige station wagon.”165
While L.J. was at the hospital, the police stopped James McChristine, who was driving a beige station wagon near the scene of the attack, and brought him to the hospital.166 An officer testified that L.J.
“positively identified” McChristine as her attacker that night; at William’s trial, L.J. testified that she told the officer that McChristine
was not her attacker.167
The hospital sent the Illinois State Police Crime Lab evidence
from L.J.’s rape examination, including her blood sample and vaginal
swabs.168 Semen was detected in the vaginal sample, and the evidence
was stored in a freezer for nine months until it was sent to Cellmark,
a laboratory in Illinois for DNA analysis.169 Cellmark returned a
report providing a DNA profile of the semen from the vaginal swab.170
A DNA “hit” was generated in March 2001 linking Williams to

161. A narrow reading of Melendez-Diaz would have allowed states to evade
Confrontation Clause requirements by admitting into evidence unsworn laboratory
certificates or other scientific reports. Moreno, supra note 75, at 331. Similarly, a narrow
reading of Bullcoming would allow states to evade Confrontation Clause requirements by
using Rule 703 to have an expert witness base their conclusions on inadmissible
testimonial evidence.
162. Williams II, 939 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (June
28, 2011) (No. 10-8505).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 156, at 5.
167. Id.; see People v. Williams (Williams I), 895 N.E.2d 961, 963 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008),
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090
(June 28, 2011) (No. 10-8505).
168. Williams II, 939 N.E.2d at 270.
169. Id. at 270-71.
170. Id. at 271.
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L.J.’s attack, after which L.J. identified Williams as her attacker in
a lineup.171
At trial, forensic biologist Sandra Lambatos stated that she
matched Cellmark’s reported DNA profile to Williams, whose DNA
was in the Illinois DNA database from an unrelated arrest.172 She did
not personally analyze the semen sample sent to Cellmark, instead
relying on the DNA profile within the resulting report.173 Cellmark’s
report reflected that the semen sample contained “a mixture of DNA
profiles,” and Lambatos “opined” that Cellmark likely extracted L.J.’s
DNA profile from the mixture to deduce the resulting male’s DNA
profile.174 Still, Cellmark’s resulting report reflected “unaccounted
genetic material,” which Lambatos described as “white noise.”175
Lambatos admitted it was possible Cellmark had a degraded evidence sample, though she did not observe any signs of degradation
from Cellmark’s report.176
While Lambatos testified that Cellmark was an accredited laboratory and that they “generally performed proficiency tests” that she
developed, she admitted that she did not observe the tests the
Cellmark analysts performed and that Cellmark had “different procedures and standards” than the ones followed at the Illinois State
Crime Lab.177 No one from Cellmark testified at William’s trial about
Cellmark’s procedures, how the DNA test was performed, or the
education and training of the analysts who performed the test.178
Williams was sentenced to two concurrent natural life terms, a consecutive 60-year term, and another concurrent term of 15 years.179
Relying on Rule 703, the Illinois Court of Appeals rejected Williams’s argument that Lambatos could not provide a proper foundation
for Cellmark’s test results, which were not entered into evidence.180
The court also rejected Williams’s Confrontation Clause arguments,
stating that under Crawford, the prosecution was permitted to
disclose testimonial information at trial to “provide a basis for Lambatos’[s] opinion,” and that Cellmark’s DNA profile report was not
discussed to prove the truth of the matter.181
On appeal in 2010, the Illinois Supreme Court held that it was not
bound by Melendez-Diaz, simply because the prosecution did not offer
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Williams I, 895 N.E. 2d at 964.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 156, at 6.
Williams I, 895 N.E. 2d at 965.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 966.
Id. at 963.
Id. at 966-67.
Id. at 969-70 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004)).
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Cellmark’s report into evidence.182 As such, the court held that a
Confrontation Clause violation would only occur if the Cellmark report was hearsay introduced to prove the truth of the matter.183
Instead of finding that the Cellmark report was admitted to prove
Cellmark’s assertions, however, the court found “[t]he evidence
against the defendant was Lambatos’[s] opinion, not Cellmark’s
report.”184 Because Lambatos did not read from Cellmark’s report and
it was part of the data she looked at to form her opinion, it was discussed to show the trial court the basis of her opinion, not to prove
the truth as to its contents.185
B. Analyzing Williams v. Illinois
While expert witnesses can use inadmissible evidence as the basis
for their opinion at trial, the Federal Rules of Evidence cannot trump
the Sixth Amendment’s constitutionally guaranteed rights.186 The
Supreme Court should not allow states to evade Confrontation
Clause requirements solely because a Federal Rule of Evidence, in
and of itself, would permit the testimony. Importantly, Rule 703
“does not purport to state a constitutional principle. Nor does it state
an evidentiary principle of long standing; it was developed and
adopted in the third quarter of the 20th century.”187 As such, Rule
703 appears to work best in civil cases and with nontestimonial evidence, neither of which implicate the Confrontation Clause. But,
when Rule 703 does come into conflict with the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause, it is unfathomable anyone would suggest the
nearly 240-year-old Constitution should give way for an evidentiary
rule enacted less than fifty years ago.
Like the Illinois State Supreme Court in People v. Williams, many
courts have permitted expert witnesses in criminal trials to use scientific evidence as the basis of their opinion, finding that so long as
the witness does not disclose the underlying testimonial evidence for
the truth of the matter asserted, the defendant’s Confrontation
Clause rights have not been violated.188 Experts may not simply
182. See Williams II, 939 N.E.2d 268, 282 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090
(June 28, 2011) (No. 10-8505), 2011 WL 2535081; Brief in Opposition for the Respondent,
supra note 152, at 9.
183. Williams II, 939 N.E.2d at 277.
184. Id. at 279 (stating “there is room for subjective judgment” in the DNA analysis).
185. Id. at 282.
186. FED. R. EVID. 703 (2010); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (holding “we do not think the
Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules
of evidence”).
187. Richard D. Friedman, Initial Thoughts on Williams, THE CONFRONTATION BLOG
(July 9, 2011, 2:26 AM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2011/07/initial-thoughts-onwilliams.html.
188. United States v. Williams, 740 F. Supp. 2d 4, 9-10 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding the
expert witness could not disclose the underlying testimonial hearsay on which he based his
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adopt the opinion of the original analyst or testimonial report; rather,
they can only testify to conclusions reached through their own independent judgment.189 If a substitute analyst will not be “relying upon
her own expertise in arriving at her conclusions, . . . the integrity of
the judicial system” would be better served by rescheduling the trial
so the test-performing analyst can testify.190
The real danger with allowing an uninvolved expert witness to
testify, without also requiring the testimony of the analyst responsible
for the testimonial material, is that the expert may base her decisions on erroneous or corrupt work product. Logically, the expert’s
opinion is only as solid as the underlying evidence upon which she
relied. The test-performing scientist’s veracity, capability, and accuracy simply cannot be evaluated in court through a surrogate witness.
As is true with any witness providing hearsay testimony, the trial
judge or jury cannot directly uncover the truth of the matter asserted
because the witness is testifying to something she did not personally
experience. The person who does not witness the scientific tests cannot testify at trial with 100% accuracy to the truth of the evidence
upon which she relied. An analyst who was not present when the
tests were performed cannot testify whether the lab’s procedures
were followed or whether the tests were completely fabricated.
Even if the test-performing analyst is an honest, hard-working
scientist, it does not necessarily follow that she was competent and
did not make a mistake along the way. Like any other expert witness,
forcing laboratory scientists to face cross-examination gives the
defendant an opportunity to expose a “lack of proper training or deficiency in judgment.”191
Despite this reasoning, the Court could instead affirm the Illinois
Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Illinois. Perhaps one of the bigopinion); United States v. Mirabal, No. CR 09-3207 JB, 2010 WL 3834072, at *4 (D.N.M.
Aug. 7, 2010) (holding that the testifying expert’s conclusions “must be her own, and not a
parroting of” the other analyst’s); United States v. Alexander, Nos. 2:04-cr-71, 2:09-cv-294,
2010 WL 404072, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 25, 2010) (holding the Confrontation Clause was not
violated where the expert testified to his own independent analysis); Commonwealth v.
Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1029 (Mass. 2009) (holding that the expert could not testify about
the testimonial findings within an autopsy report); Marshall v. State, 232 P.3d 467, 475
(Okla. Crim. App. 2010) (holding that the expert witness’s testimony “must be confined to
his or her own opinions and the expert must be available for cross-examination”); Wood v.
State, 299 S.W. 3d 200, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (holding that disclosing testimonial
statements from an autopsy report, even though the witness also testified to his own
independent opinion, was a Confrontation Clause violation).
189. Williams, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 9. The Fourth Circuit has also held that an expert
witness may not testify to the conclusions of another analyst absent from trial in an effort
to bolster his or her own opinion. United States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d 1132, 1143
(4th Cir. 1994) (prohibiting an expert witness from testifying that his and a more
prominent doctor’s conclusions were “essentially the same”).
190. Mirabal, 2010 WL 3834072, at *6.
191. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009).
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gest issues the case will turn upon is the Justices’ opinion of the
“formality” of the Cellmark report. While Bullcoming made clear a
scientific report does not achieve formality because it is sworn, Justice
Thomas and even Justice Sotomayor may find that it is the report’s
actual admission into evidence that gives the report the requisite
formality to be considered testimonial. Justice Thomas may find that
a scientific report used by an expert witness at trial but not admitted
into evidence does not implicate the types of confrontation issues with
which the Framers were historically concerned.192 Historically, the
Framers might not have been concerned with more informal, casual
comments being submitted at trial in place of live testimony.193
However, whether or not laboratory reports are admitted into evidence should not be the controlling factor in Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence. Accusations at trial, particularly ones involving scientific evidence, appear much more formal than casual commentary
made to a friend.194 Further, when expert witnesses are significantly
relying on the result of one scientific test to form the basis of their
opinions, the expert witnesses become more “summary witness[es]”
than experts in their own right.195
While it is true that it is Lambatos’s expert opinion that is at issue, so too is the authenticity and accuracy of the evidence upon
which she based her opinion. Williams should have had not only the
opportunity through cross-examination to test the credibility and reliability of the expert but also the authenticity and reliability of the
scientific evidence upon which she based her opinion. Williams could
not have had this opportunity without the ability to cross-examine
the Cellmark analyst who certified the test results.
Such a rule would not unduly burden prosecutors and law enforcement. Twice now the Supreme Court has approved of states’ use
of notice and demand statutes, which provide a limited window within which a defendant may invoke—or else waive—her Confrontation
Clause right after receiving notice of the government’s intent to use
scientific evidence at trial.196 In fact, “there is no evidence that the
criminal justice system has ground to a halt in the States that, one
way or another, empower a defendant to insist upon the analyst’s ap-

192. Ross, supra note 128, at 386 (stating that “Justice Thomas believes that the Court
should determine which abuses threatened confrontation rights at the time of the
Founders, and freeze the application of the Clause to cover only those abuses”).
193. Id. at 385-86.
194. Id. at 386 (stating “jurors often believe statements made to doctors”); see also
supra note 69 about the “CSI Effect.”
195. See United States v. Williams, 431 F.2d 1168, 1172 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that a
witness needs to rely on multiple sources of evidence and use them to form his own opinion,
not simply summarize the content of an extrajudicial statement).
196. Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2011); Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541.
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pearance at trial.”197 With few cases actually going to trial, and defendants frequently stipulating the admission of forensic evidence in
the cases that do,198 prosecutors have the ability to manage the Confrontation Clause’s constitutional requirements.
VI. CONCLUSION
States cannot ignore the obligations of the Confrontation Clause
simply because the Clause might make “the prosecution of criminals
more burdensome.”199 Indeed, the Court has shown its willingness to
enforce constitutional guarantees, even though these protections may
result in additional costs for taxpayers.200 Through its Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence in Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming,
the Court has already established that a surrogate witness cannot
testify to laboratory reports certified by other scientists not appearing at trial. By reversing the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in
People v. Williams, the Court would affirm the importance of preventing the admission of accusatory hearsay evidence without crossexamination in criminal trials. Prosecutors should not be able to
dodge the Confrontation Clause’s requirements simply by keeping a
testimonial report, upon which the testifying substitute witness bases their decision, out of evidence.201
Following Bullcoming, only one proposition in Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence is certain: We have not heard the Court’s last
word on the Sixth Amendment’s requirements for the admission of
scientific evidence in criminal trials.

197. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541.
198. Bullcoming III, 131 S. Ct at 2718 (Ginsberg & Scalia, JJ.).
199. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540 (stating the right of confrontation is “binding”
and comparing it to the right of trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination).
200. See, e.g., Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6,
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (No. 07-591) (citing Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 340
(1963) as an example).
201. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006) (holding that “we do not think
it conceivable that the protections of the Confrontation Clause can readily be evaded by
having a note-taking policeman recite the unsworn hearsay testimony”).
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